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 James E. Hocker appeals pro se from an order of the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania denying his motion for compassionate release 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).  The Government has filed a motion for summary 
affirmance.  For the following reasons, we grant the Government’s motion and will 
summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 In 2018, Hocker pleaded guilty to securities fraud.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1348.  The 
next year, he was sentenced to 204 months of imprisonment.  We affirmed.  See United 
States v. Hocker, No. 19-2379, -- F. App’x –, 2021 WL 2879343 (3d Cir. July 9, 2021).    
 In August 2020, Hocker filed a pro se motion for compassionate release pursuant 
to § 3582(c)(1)(A).  (ECF 36.)  He argued that various health conditions, including 
“coronary artery disease, sleep apnea, and diabetes (borderline),” put him at increased 
risk from COVID-19.  The Government opposed the motion.  (ECF 42.) 
The District Court denied relief.  (ECF 45.)  It agreed with the Government’s 
concession that Hocker had shown that extraordinary and compelling reasons warranted 
relief.  But the District Court concluded that the relevant factors under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a) weighed against any reduction in his sentence.  Those factors included the 
seriousness of Hocker’s offense, his criminal history, the likelihood of recidivism, and 
the fact that he had served less than a quarter of his sentence.  Hocker appeals.  The 
 




Government has filed a motion for summary affirmance (Doc. 10), to which Hocker 
objects.  (Doc. 12). 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review for abuse of discretion 
the denial of an eligible defendant’s motion for a sentence modification under § 3582(c).  
See United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2020).  Thus, we “will not 
disturb the District Court’s decision unless there is a definite and firm conviction that it 
committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the 
relevant factors.”  Id. (alteration, quotation marks, and citation omitted).  We may affirm 
on any basis supported by the record.  See Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 
2011) (per curiam).  
The compassionate release provision states that a district court “may reduce the 
term of imprisonment” and “impose a term of probation or supervised release” if it finds 
that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).  Before granting compassionate release, a district court must consider 
“the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C. §] 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable.”  
§ 3582(c)(1)(A).  Those factors include, among other things, “the nature and 
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,” 
§ 3553(a)(1), and the need for the sentence “to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to 




adequate deterrence to criminal conduct”; and “to protect the public from further crimes 
of the defendant,” § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(C).   
We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Hocker’s compassionate release motion because the applicable § 3553(a) factors do not 
support relief.  Hocker’s crime was serious.  For several years, he defrauded numerous, 
often elderly, individuals, who lost some or all of their retirement and life savings.  See 
Hocker, 2021 WL 2879343, at *1 (stating that Hocker “targeted the elderly, those nearing 
or entering retirement, and others with limited investment experience”).  The losses from 
his actions totaled almost $1.5 million.  In addition, Hocker had been convicted of 
numerous DUI offenses, and committed the underlying offense while on supervision for 
two of those convictions.  Finally, Hocker had served only 17 months of a 17 year 
sentence.  See Pawlowski, 967 F.3d at 331 (stating that “the time remaining in [the] 
sentence may—along with the circumstances underlying the motion for compassionate 
release and the need to avoid unwarranted disparities among similarly situated inmates—
inform whether immediate release would be consistent with” the § 3553(a) factors).  
These factors support the District Court’s conclusion that continued incarceration was 
needed to afford adequate deterrence, promote respect for the law, provide just 
punishment, and protect the public. 
For the foregoing reasons, we grant the Government’s motion and will summarily 
affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
